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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Recent civil unrest in Hong Kong has brought more international attention to 
the state of the relationship between Hong Kong and mainland China. The degree 
of control that the mainland has over Hong Kong has risen in saliency over the 
past several years. While many of the questions surrounding the recent unrest 
have been concerned with the political structure between the special administra-
tive region and the central government, the international media and scholars have 
given little attention to the continuation of the Hong Kong legal tradition when 
it comes to the framework of its international contracts. Because of the United 
Kingdom’s colonial sovereignty over the city-state, Hong Kong inherited the An-
glo-Saxon tradition of common law, which continues even after the separation 
of Hong Kong from the United Kingdom in 1996.1 However, whether the main-
land has changed this tradition by pushing Hong Kong into international obliga-
tions is still a question that has befuddled courts across the globe. 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG)2  was ratified by China on December 11, 1986, applying the CISG 
to the whole of China.3 Pursuant to the terms of Article 93 of the CISG, a con-
tracting state must expressly file a declaration with the depositary of the United 
Nations if it wishes to limit the applicability of the Convention to specific terri-
tories of separate law systems.4 In 1997, China issued a declaration listing inter-
national agreements that would apply to Hong Kong.5 Yet, the CISG was not on 
this list, and China has not issued an express Article 93 declaration pursuant to 
the CISG at the time of this writing.6 Instead, courts have been left to interpret 
whether China’s 1997 list qualifies as an Article 93 declaration that removes 
Hong Kong from the CISG’s sphere of applicability by virtue of negative infer-
ence. This question has arisen time and time again as Hong Kong companies 
 
 1 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong 
Kong, 1399 U.N.T.S. 61 [hereinafter Joint Declaration]. 
 2 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 
1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG]. 
 3 Status of Treaties, U.N. CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR INT’L SALE GOODS, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=X-
10&chapter=10&clang=_en#EndDec (last visited Mar. 2, 2021). 
 4 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 93. 
 5 Letter of Notification of Treaties Applicable to Hong Kong After 1 July 1997, Depos-
ited by the Government of the People’s Republic of China with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, June 20, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1675. 
 6 Status of Treaties, supra note 3. 
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contract around the world for the trade of goods and subsequently get hauled into 
court when the contracts are in dispute. 
In 2004, staff attorney Ulrich Schroeter, with the German consulate in Hong 
Kong, published an initial study addressing this question in 2004.7 Schroeter ar-
gues that the CISG does apply to Hong Kong by virtue of the policies of the 
CISG and the power of the Chinese central government over the international 
obligations of Hong Kong.8 The study conducted under this Note ultimately 
agrees with Schroeter, but I expound upon the growing friction that this question 
has created in international courts since the publication of Schroeter’s study. This 
Note addresses the significance of the CISG’s drafting history and its evolution 
from the Hague Conventions that preceded it. Moreover, this Note argues that 
the trend of international courts in the past decades has, for the most part, di-
verged from the purposes and intent of the CISG. Many of the reported cases 
discussed by this Note have interpreted China’s 1997 list to constitute an Article 




On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong receded back to China from the United Kingdom, 
and in this recession, the two nations set forth the guidelines for the continuation 
of Hong Kong’s political and economic rights.9 In the Opium Wars of the Eight-
eenth Century, Britain obtained concessions of land from imperial China includ-
ing and surrounding the island of Hong Kong.10 After the People’s Republic of 
China solidified itself as the governing power on the Chinese mainland, China 
took up the position that many of the treaties between imperial China and western 
powers were invalidated by coercive bargaining, and the nation set about apply-
ing pressure to recover lost territories.11 In an effort to maintain good relations 
and to preempt the rise of any localized instability, the governments of China 
and the United Kingdom reached an agreement on May 27, 1985, called the Sino-
British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, in which Hong Kong 
 
 7 Ulrich G. Schroeter, The Status of Hong Kong and Macao Under the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 16 PACE INT’L L. REV. 307 
(2004). 
 8 Id. at 325, 332. 
 9 Joint Declaration, supra note 1. 
 10 Donna Deese Skeen, Can Capitalism Survive Under Communist Rule? The Effect of 
Hong Kong’s Reversion to the People’s Republic of China in 1997, 29 INT’L L. 175, 177 
(1995). 
 11 Id. at 176. 
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would recede back to China on July 1, 1997.12 The international community 
viewed the Joint Declaration as a treaty, but China has expressed the opinion that 
it is purely a declaration that puts words to what is, in effect, sovereign grace, 
therefore leaving the binding nature of its provisions questionable.13   
The Joint Declaration summarily appears to be a document reflecting a wish 
for continuance of the status quo. The Joint Declaration provides that the “laws 
currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged” and “[t]he 
current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged . . . 
[r]ights and freedoms . . . will be ensured by law.”14 The annexes to the Joint 
Declaration go on to elaborate what the law of Hong Kong will be, stating: 
After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong (i.e., the com-
mon law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and 
customary law) shall be maintained, save for any that contravene 
the Basic Law and subject to any amendment by the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region legislature.15 
The Joint Declaration leaves much room for the bending of its terms and the 
creation of new restrictions via its qualifying language. Commentators note that 
the Joint Declaration is full of nebulous and imprecise language such as “[t]he 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will enjoy a high degree of auton-
omy” and “the laws previously in force . . . shall be maintained, save for any that 
contravene the Basic Law.”16 Indeed, Article 3(12) leaves much of the interpre-
tation of the agreement open to China, stating: 
The above-stated basic policies of the People’s Republic of China 
regarding Hong Kong and the elaboration of them in annex I to 
this Joint Declaration will be stipulated, in a Basic Law of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Re-
public of China, by the National People’s Congress of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, and they will remain unchanged for 50 
years.17 
 
 12 Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 62. 
 13 Skeen, supra note 10, at 178. 
 14 Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 61–62. 
 15 Id. at 64. 
 16 Id. at 61, 64. See Skeen, supra note 10, at 181 (noting that the phrases “high degree” 
and “save for any that contravene the Basic Law” provide nothing concrete and too much 
qualification). 
 17 Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 62. 
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  The National People’s Congress passed the “Basic Law” referenced in the 
Article in 1990 and it became effective on July 1, 1997, the date that Hong Kong 
receded back to China.18 The Basic Law does textually give effect to the lan-
guage of the Joint Declaration and provides that the Standing Committee of the 
national government may invalidate any Hong Kong law or ruling that contra-
venes the Basic Law.19 Moreover, the interpretation of the Basic Law is not 
solely left to an independent Hong Kong judiciary; instead, whenever a decision 
concerning a Basic Law provision that affects the central government is before 
the Hong Kong courts, they must consult with the Standing Committee.20 Thus, 
any law or decision promulgated by the Hong Kong government and judiciary 
may be determined by the central government to be in contravention of the Basic 
Law.  
Prior to the recession of Hong Kong back to China, the United Kingdom was 
not—and still is not—a ratifying state to the CISG.21 Thus, Hong Kong was never 
an applicable territory of the CISG during the establishment of its “laws previ-
ously in force” provision22 for the purposes of the Basic Law.23 Article 153 of 
the Basic Law provides that: 
The application to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
of international agreements to which the People’s Republic of 
China is or becomes a party shall be decided by the Central Peo-
ple’s Government, in accordance with the circumstances and 
needs of the Region, and after seeking the views of the govern-
ment of the Region.24 
Article 153 removes any doubt that, though Hong Kong retains economic cap-
italist freedom, international agreements on trade or uniform contract law may 
be imposed on Hong Kong by the central government. China was, and is, a rati-
fying state of the CISG.25 Hence, domestically, the central government appears 
empowered to issue an Article 93 declaration under the CISG to reserve or ex-
pressly apply the CISG to Hong Kong. Indeed, the central government has 
 
 18 People’s Republic of China: The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of the People’s Republic of China, 29 I.L.M. 1519 (1990) [hereinafter Basic Law]. 
 19 Id. at art. 158. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See Status of Treaties, supra note 3. 
 22 Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 64. 
 23 Basic Law, supra note 18, at art. 8. 
 24 Id. at art. 153. 
 25 Status of Treaties, supra note 3. 
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apparently used this power to great effect.26 Accordingly, courts have been left 
to interpret whether China’s list of applicable conventions to Hong Kong quali-




The reasoning behind the drafting of the CISG, specifically Article 93, closely 
reflects the reality of Hong Kong’s relationship with mainland China as an au-
tonomous special administrative region. An analysis of the drafting of the CISG 
is useful for discussing the applicability of the CISG to Hong Kong in light of 
the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. Additionally, the application of uniform 
international law requires analysis of how international courts have tried to find 
cohesion in the CISG’s interpretation. 
 
A. The Drafting of the CISG 
 
Schroeter argues that Article 93 of the CISG is a mere injection at the request 
of Canada and Australia on the drafting committee.27 But the history and evolu-
tion behind Article 93 and the CISG as a whole is more influential than this brief 
allusion might give it credit for. The CISG is a byproduct of the United Nations’ 
push for global economic integration as a source of global well-being, and it fol-
lows previous attempts at creating uniform laws of contract and sale undertaken 
by the United Nations.28 The Hague Convention of 1955 and the Hague Conven-
tion of 1964 served as the principle attempts at creating a multinational agree-
ment for the contract and sale of goods.29 Both Hague Conventions included pre-
cursory articles of territorial applicability to Article 93 of the CISG, and the 
examination of this development provides insight into the shift in focus by the 
 
 26 See Letter of Notification of Treaties Applicable to Hong Kong After 1 July 1997, supra 
note 5; U.N. Secretary-General (Depositary Notification), Notification by China and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Relating to Hong Kong, C.N.276.1997 
(Aug. 18, 1997) (notifying the United Nations of China’s reservations to international treaties 
of transit, navigable waters, and customs, with respect to Hong Kong); U.N. Secretary-General 
(Depositary Notification), Notification by China Relating to Hong Kong, C.N.318.1997 (Aug. 
22, 1997) (notifying the United Nations of China’s application of the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs to Hong Kong). 
 27 Schroeter, supra note 7, at 320 (noting that Canada and Australia requested to clause to 
accommodate federal states with more than one legal system in place). 
 28 Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. on the Work of Its Second Session, ¶ 38, U.N. Doc. 
A/7618 (1969) [hereafter Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 1969]. 
 29 Id. at 11. 
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United Nations to make such uniform laws and agreements more appealing to 
prospective ratifying states. 
The Hague Convention of 1955 reflects a very Eurocentric basis for interna-
tional trade. This Eurocentricity extends to the language of the adopted agree-
ment with Article 10, which is the apparent precursor to Article 93 in the CISG, 
stating, in part, “[t]his Convention shall apply to the metropolitan territories of 
the Contracting States as a matter of course.”30 The term “metropolitan territo-
ries” in its usage in international law denotes “the territory of the parent State of 
a colony or any other type of dependent territory in respect of which the metro-
politan State exercises international functions.”31 In other words, the use of the 
term metropolitan territories in Article 10 extends the applicability of the Con-
vention to the “homeland” of a state, as opposed to the dependent external terri-
tories of the state. Thus, the default rule of the Convention is to not apply the 
treaty to dependent territories. Historically, treaties did not provide for any sev-
erance in the territorial application, and states would apply a treaty’s terms unre-
servedly to their territories.32 However, after 1945, colonial powers began to in-
clude territorial application clauses to account for dependent territories that 
required separate regulation.33   
Article 10 also reflects a territorial application clause procedure that is now 
commonplace in international law and present in both the Hague Convention of 
1964 and Article 93 of the CISG.34 This procedure is the filing of a notification 
with an assigned depositary.35 Article 10 goes on to state: 
If a Contracting State wishes the Convention to be applicable to 
all its other territories, or to those of its other territories for the 
international relations of which it is responsible, it shall give no-
tice of its intention in this regard by an instrument which shall be 
deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nether-
lands.36 
Building on the Hague Convention of 1955, the Hague Convention of 1964 
changed the substantive rules of international contract and issued the first uni-
form law in this field with the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for 
 
 30 Convention on the Law Applicable to the International Sales of Goods art. 10, June 15, 
1955, 510 U.N.T.S. 147 [hereinafter The Hague Convention of 1955]. 
 31 Metropolitan Territory, ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 
2009). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 The Hague Convention of 1955, supra note 30, at art. 10. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
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the International Sale of Goods.37 However, the Convention of 1964 did not 
change the default rule of 1955, where a state must notify the depositary of its 
intent to extend the application to dependent territories.38 Article XI, which is the 
territorial application clause of the Hague Convention of 1964, provides the fol-
lowing: 
Any State may, at the time of the deposit of its instrument of rat-
ification or accession or at any time thereafter, declare, by means 
of a notification addressed to the Government of the Netherlands, 
that the present Convention shall be applicable to all or any of the 
territories for whose international relations it is responsible.39 
Article XI does drop the preface of “metropolitan territories” that is found in 
the Hague Convention of 1955, removing the connotation of colonialism. But the 
general application of the Hague Convention of 1964 is still only to what would 
qualify as a metropolitan territory or motherland, with an Article XI declaration 
being the avenue for states to extend the application to dependent territories. In 
1969, the historic rules of treaty application changed with the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties.40 In accordance with the Vienna Convention, an agree-
ment will apply to the entire territory of a ratifying state unless the agreement a 
contrary intention appears in the language or is otherwise established.41 It is 
likely from this new presumption of absolute application that the CISG draws 
the basis for Article 93. 
Article 93 of the CISG shifts the default rule from solely metropolitan appli-
cation into absolute application. Article 93 of the CISG requires a ratifying state 
to file a declaration naming what territories the treaty will extend to.42 Otherwise, 
the application will be extended to all territories. Restated, Article 93 provides, 
in part, that: 
If a Contracting State has two or more territorial units in which, 
according to its constitution, different systems of law are appli-
cable in relation to the matters dealt with in this Convention, it 
may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or 
 
 37 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 169 [hereinafter the Hague Convention of 
1964]. 
 38 Id. at art. XI; The Hague Convention of 1955, supra note 30, at art. 10. 
 39 The Hague Convention of 1964, supra note 37, at art. XI. 
 40 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 29, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 41 Id. 
 42 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 93. 
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accession, declare that this Convention is to extend to all its ter-
ritorial units or only to one or more of them . . . .43 
On its face, Article 93 does not appear much different from Article 10 of the 
Hague Convention of 1955 or Article XI of the Hague Convention of 1964. Ar-
ticle 93 does condition any declaration on a presence of two or more different 
law systems in a state, but the procedure is laid out in similar verbiage as the 
Hague Conventions, notably the phrase “declare that this Convention is to extend 
to all its territorial units or only to one or more of them.”44 However, paragraph 
four of Article 93 removes any doubt that the CISG is modeled after the Vienna 
Convention, stating: “If a Contracting State makes no declaration under para-
graph (1) of this article, the Convention is to extend to all territorial units of that 
State.”45 Further, under paragraph two, the declaration must “state expressly the 
territorial units to which the Convention extends.”46 
In practice, the application of CISG has been absolute and in line with the 
Vienna Convention unless a state files an Article 93 declaration, as evidenced by 
the ratifying states that have filed Article 93 declarations.47 Both Canada and 
Denmark are nations with territories of fluctuant autonomy and law systems, and 
both have used Article 93 declarations as a way to either slowly integrate the 
CISG into their territories or abstain from those territories altogether.48 In 1991, 
Canada acceded to the CISG but issued an Article 93 declaration to extend ap-
plication to all territories except Quebec and Saskatchewan.49 A little over a year 
 
 43 Id. at art. 93 (2). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See U.N. Secretary-General (Depositary Notification), United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods Concluded in Vienna on 11 April 1980: Acces-
sion by Canada, C.N.88.1991 (May 31, 1991) [hereinafter Canada 1991 Declaration] (declar-
ing, expressly in reference to Article 93, that the CISG will apply to the territories of Alberta, 
British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince 
Edward’s Island, and the Northwest Territories); U.N. Secretary-General (Depositary Notifi-
cation), United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods Con-
cluded in Vienna on 11 April 1980: Accession by Canada, C.N.255.1992 (Oct. 19, 1992) [here-
inafter Canada 1992 Declaration] (declaring, expressly in reference to Article 93, that the 
CISG will apply to Quebec and Saskatchewan); U.N. Secretary-General (Depositary Notifi-
cation), United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods Con-
cluded in Vienna on 11 April 1980: Ratification by Denmark and the German Democratic 
Republic, C.N.41.1989 (Apr. 17, 1989) [hereinafter Denmark Declaration] (declaring, ex-
pressly in reference to Article 93, that the CISG will not apply to the Faroe Islands and Green-
land). 
 48 Canada 1991 Declaration, supra note 47; Canada 1992 Declaration, supra note 47; 
Denmark Declaration, supra note 47. 
 49 Canada 1991 Declaration, supra note 47. 
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later, in 1992, Canada issued a second Article 93 declaration to expressly extend 
application to Quebec and Saskatchewan.50 In accordance with Article 93(2), in 
both instances Canada expressly stated and listed the territories to which the 
CISG would apply.51 Similarly, in 1989, Denmark ratified the CISG and filed an 
Article 93 declaration to reserve application from Greenland and the Faroe Is-
lands.52 Noticeably, rather than expressly state what territories the CISG would 
apply to, Denmark expressly stated the territories to which the CISG would not 
apply.53 In the declarations of both Canada and Denmark, the depositary accepted 
the language and effectuated Article 93 to keep the CISG from applying to those 
territories the states did not intend for it to apply. 
The examples of Denmark and Canada illustrate one of the purposes behind 
the overhaul of the Hague Conventions into the CISG. Previously, the Hague 
Conventions and their pre-Vienna “metropolitan” language permitted colonial 
systems—but not complex federal systems—to direct the application of the uni-
form laws.54 The language of Article 93 in the CISG modernized the application 
of the uniform laws to account for not just resemblances of a colonial system, 
but also flexible federated systems.55 This federal flexibility is what permitted 
Canada to stagger the application of CISG to its provinces; provinces which one 
might not deign to call colonies of the Canadian metropole like the Hague Con-
vention of 1955 suggests. While Greenland and the Faroe Islands might not be 
provinces or states like those of Canada, they are also not colonies of Denmark. 
Rather, Greenland and the Faroe Islands represent highly autonomous territories 
that Denmark maintains responsibility for within international relations and de-
fense.56 
The drafting of the CISG was accompanied by a purpose to de-westernize the 
existing uniform rules and create more flexibility.57 These purposes are apparent 
in the United Nations reports that would ultimately lead up to the establishment 
of a uniform law working group.58 In a report to the General Assembly in 1969, 
 
 50 Canada 1992 Declaration, supra note 47. 
 51 Id.; Canada 1991 Declaration, supra note 47; CISG, supra note 2, at art. 93, ¶ 2. 
 52 Denmark Declaration, supra note 47. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See Metropolitan Territory, supra note 31. 
 55 United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Digest of Case Law on the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, at 422, ¶ 1 (2016) 
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/clout/CISG_Digest_2016.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL 
Digest] (stating that Article 93 “enables federal States to accede to the Convention for some 
territorial units when otherwise legally restricted to apply it to all their territorial units”). 
 56 The Greenland Committee, FOLKETINGET: THE DANISH PARLIAMENT, 
https://www.thedanishparliament.dk/en/committees/committees/the-greenland-commit-
tee#:~:text=In%20the%20vast%20majority%20of,the%20Danish%20Govern-
ment%20and%20Parliament (last visited April 28, 2021). 
 57 Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 1969, supra note 28, ¶ 38, § 3(a). 
 58 Id. 
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the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) cre-
ated a working group to analyze “which modifications of the existing texts might 
render them capable of wider acceptance by countries of different legal, social 
and economic systems.”59 The United Nations had noticed the sparse number of 
states ratifying the Hague Conventions and issued questions to member states for 
the working group to analyze why so many states were not ratifying the Conven-
tions.60 In answer, the working group’s goal was to draft uniform rules that would 
bridge the gaps between legal systems,61 removing the Eurocentricity of the 
Hague Conventions and “promot[ing] harmonization of substantive law by the 
largest number of States, regardless of their legal tradition.”62 As one representa-
tive of UNCITRAL noted, “in international trade, especially in East-West trade, 
both parties often proposed their own detailed forms; as a result substantial time 
was spent in reaching agreement on the provisions of the contract. A set of uni-
form conditions could simplify this procedure.”63   
 
B. International Case Law 
 
Courts around the world have issued disparate opinions on whether the CISG 
does apply to Hong Kong. Fortunately, Article 7(1) of the CISG offers instruc-
tion on how fora are to interpret the provisions of the Convention. Article 7(1) 
provides: “In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its in-
ternational character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and 
the observance of good faith in international trade.”64 Courts have taken Article 
7(1) to mean that the CISG must be interpreted and “applied exclusively on its 
own terms” and without reference to national law, which would corrupt the “in-
ternational character” of the Convention.65 Unfortunately, courts have tried their 
best to “autonomously” apply the CISG, but have come to wildly different con-
clusions.66 Because the international character and policy of uniformity promotes 
the influence and persuasiveness of international courts, tribunals often look to 
 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. ¶ 38. 
 61 Id. 
 62 UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 55, at xi, ¶ 4. 
 63 Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixth Session, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. 
A/9017 (1973) [hereafter Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 1973]. 
 64 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 7, ¶ 1. 
 65 UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 55, at 42, ¶¶ 2–6. 
 66 Id. 
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decisions made by other courts in other countries.67 As one scholar has succinctly 
put it: 
The consequence of Art. 7 (1) and the duty to consider foreign 
case law is not that an official stare decisis exists. Rather, the ef-
fect is that an adjudicator must take relevant court and arbitral 
decisions into consideration to the extent that they are available 
and only differ from them if there is good reason for doing so.  
The interpretive value of foreign decisions will then depend on 
their persuasive value and it is up to adjudicators to be persuaded 
by well-reasoned decisions, as well as be reluctant to deviate from 
a foreign line of corresponding precedents.68 
 
i. Chinese Jurisprudence 
 
Because Article 93 places the impetus of declaring territorial applicability on 
the filing state, courts and scholars may look to the jurisprudence of Chinese 
courts for aid in determining whether the CISG applies to Hong Kong. The logic 
is that the domestic courts of the pertinent country would have the best disposi-
tion towards the intent of the government filing—in this case, the filing of 
China’s list of applied conventions to Hong Kong.69 Much to the chagrin of in-
terested scholars and judges, however, the Chinese courts have been neither in-
structive nor consistent when they have addressed the question. 
Commentators have remarked on a particular “homeward trend” that the Chi-
nese courts have seemed to adopt when cases implicate the CISG. International 
law professor Thomas Neumann argues that the Chinese courts have avoided 
applying the CISG to Article 80 arbitral awards, instead opting for a remedy 
mirroring domestic Chinese law.70 Additionally, Neumann brings attention to the 
significant problem that Chinese law does not require domestic courts to provide 
a legal basis for their decisions.71 This lack of stated reasoning frequently thwarts 
the “international” character of the CISG to establish uniformity across 
 
 67 Id. ¶ 7. 
 68 Thomas Neumann, Chinese Success and Failure in Achieving Uniform Application of 
the CISG, 16 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 83, 87 (2010) (citations omitted). 
 69 See generally Innotex Precision Ltd. v. Horei Image Prods., Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 
1359 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (discussing how the Chinese Courts have applied the CISG to Hong 
Kong). 
 70 See Neumann, supra note 68, at 92–93 (noting that the Chinese Contract Law may have 
provided the basis for a remedy, rather than the CISG). 
 71 Id. at 93. 
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jurisdictions. More particular to this study, the failure to provide a legal basis 
compounds with the scarcity of decisions rendered by Chinese courts on the ap-
plicability of the CISG to Hong Kong. Both the scarcity of decisions on applying 
the CISG to Hong Kong and the unstated legal bases of those decisions that are 
reported create insubstantial grounds to draw any conclusions as to the predilec-
tion of the Chinese judiciary as a whole. 
Academics Qiao Liu and Xiang Ren conducted a brief survey of the cases 
where Chinese Courts rendered a decision regarding the CISG and a Hong Kong 
party.72 In the fourteen cases Liu and Ren analyzed, ten were between a Hong 
Kong party and a China mainland party and four were between a Hong Kong 
party and another contracting state party.73 In the first category of cases, four of 
the cases concluded with the courts deciding that Hong Kong and China itself 
were not separate states, and therefore, could not be two contracting states with 
each other.74 Perhaps these decisions were intended to rebuke arguments that the 
different law systems between Hong Kong and China created distinct “contract-
ing states,” but as Liu and Ren explain, “[o]bviously, even if the CISG extends 
to Hong Kong, it extends to it as a territorial unit of China, rather than as an 
independent contracting state.”75 Most poignantly, the only case found by Liu 
and Ren that directly addressed the question of Article 93 was Hong Kong 
Yingshun Development, Co. v. Zhejiang Zhongda Technology Import, Co. . . In 
Yingshun Development, the Zhejiang High People’s Court stated that because 
China had never filed an express Article 93(1) declaration, the CISG did not ap-
ply to Hong Kong.76 Yet, as Liu and Ren point out, this decision neglects to 
consider Article 93(4),77 which states: “If a Contracting State makes no declara-
tion under paragraph (1) of this article, the Convention is to extend to all territo-
rial units of that State.”78 
The remaining cases addressed by Liu and Ren, including those between a 
Hong Kong party and another contracting state party, circuitously avoided an-
swering the question of whether the CISG applied to Hong Kong. In nearly every 
case, the courts decided that either Chinese domestic law incorporated CISG law 
or that the choice of law provisions in each case elected domestic Chinese law 
over CISG law.79 Liu and Ren remark that the reasoning that Chinese domestic 
 
 72 Qiao Liu & Xiang Ren, CISG in Chinese Courts: The Issue of Applicability, 65 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 873, 888–91 (2017) (hereinafter Liu & Ren). 
 73 Id. at 888. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. See also Hong Kong Yingshun Development Co. Ltd v. Zhejiang Zhongda Tech-
nology Import Co. Ltd., Zhe Shang Wai Zhong Zi No. 99 Civil Judgment (2010). 
 77 Liu & Ren, supra note 72, at 888. 
 78 CISG, supra note 2, art. 93 at ¶ 4. 
 79 Liu & Ren, supra note 72, at 888–89. 
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law incorporates CISG law is “dubious” because China filed an Article 95 reser-
vation to exclude CISG law whenever there is a conflict with Chinese domestic 
law, a statement that runs contrary to any “incorporation” reasoning of the two 
laws.80 Other scholars have found cases where the Chinese courts simply use the 
CISG as a “gap-filler” when the parties include it in the choice of law provision 
and domestic law does not provide for a situation.81 While Liu and Ren’s study 
concentrated on the treatment by Chinese courts of Hong Kong as a “contracting 
state” under Article 1(1)(a), they conclude, like Neumann, that the Chinese 
courts have demonstrated a homeward trend to use domestic law when reviewing 
CISG law.82 Consequently, this homeward trend has both prevented any clear 
decisions from emerging on whether the CISG applies to Hong Kong and dis-
rupted the intention of the CISG to retain an international construction untainted 
by domestic law. 
 
ii. International Jurisprudence 
 
Globally, courts settling disputes between countries, and even within the same 
country, have come to different conclusions on whether the CISG applies to 
Hong Kong. Though most courts have not circumvented the question like the 
Chinese courts (except for Yingshun Development) they have grappled with the 
negative inference dilemma of China’s convention list. The courts’ interpreta-
tions appear to divide cleanly into two camps: intentionalism and formalism. The 
intentionalism courts rely on the intention of the convention list filed by China 
to be a single vehicle expressing China’s wish that the CISG not be among the 
international agreements applied to Hong Kong. The formalism courts predicate 
their conclusions on the express terms of Article 93 and the Article 93 declara-
tions of other contracting states. 
The first non-American court to squarely address this question is the Supreme 
Court of France in the Telecommunication Products Case.83 The court’s decision 
is brief, but undeniably employs an intentionalism rationale. The court held that 
the list of conventions filed by China did qualify as an Article 93 declaration 
because it “effectuated with the depositary of the Convention a formality equiv-
alent to what is provided for in Art. 93 CISG.”84 This “formality equivalent” was 
taken as procedurally sufficient to signify that China did not intend for the CISG 
 
 80 Id. at 889–90. 
 81 Xiao Yongping & Long Weidi, Selected Topics on the Application of the CISG in 
China, 20 PACE INT’L L. REV. 61, 82–84 (2008). 
 82 Liu & Ren, supra note 72, at 917; see also Neuman, supra note 68, at 94. 
 83 Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Apr. 2, 2008, no. 
04-17726 (Fr.), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080402f1.html. 
 84 Id. 
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to apply to China and that China formally stated such in its list by negative in-
ference.85 This view of intentionalism perhaps gives the most efficient and prac-
tical effect to China’s list. After all, filing declarations and notifications under 
each treaty by its own terms would be cumbersome when they all similarly re-
quire the same thing—to be filed with the depositary.86 
Courts latched on to the reasoning of the Telecommunication Products Case 
and have buttressed that opinion’s sparseness with subsequent factors. In Innotex 
Precision Ltd. v. Horei Image Products, Inc., the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Georgia references the Telecommunication Products 
Case and—after remarking on the unhelpfulness of Chinese court decisions—
notes that commentators have so far suggested not applying the CISG to Hong 
Kong for the same intentionalism and formality equivalency reasoning as the 
French court.87 Additionally, the court mentions that the Hong Kong Department 
of Justice promulgates a list of current applicable treaties to Hong Kong, and the 
CISG is not on that list.88 The United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Tennessee echoed Innotex in America’s Collectibles Network, Inc. v. Timlly 
(HK).89 The Timlly court substantively quoted Innotex, adding that the list is “es-
pecially significant,” but provided no further reasoning.90 
Some courts have taken the formalism approach; in CNA International, Inc. v. 
Guangdon Kelon Electronical Holdings et al., the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois held that the CISG did apply to Hong Kong.91 
The court interpreted the treaty by reviewing “its plain language and to ‘the gen-
eral principles’” upon which it is based.92 Quoting the United States Supreme 
Court, the court noted that “[i]t is axiomatic that a treaty’s plain language must 
control absent ‘extraordinarily strong contrary evidence.’”93 Reading the 
 
 85 Id. 
 86 CISG, supra note 2, art. 93 at ¶ 2. 
 87 Innotex, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1356, at 1359. 
 88 Id. 
 89 America’s Collectibles Network, Inc. v. Timlly (HK), 746 F. Supp. 2d 914 (E.D. Tenn. 
2010). 
 90 Id. at 920; see also Hannaford v. Australian Farmlink Pty Ltd. [2008] FCA 1591 (2008) 
(Austl.) (resolving case on other grounds, but commenting on the likelihood that the CISG 
does not apply to Hong Kong for the same reasons that the French court relied upon); see 
generally Lisa Spagnolo, The Last Outpost: Automatic CISG Opt Outs, Misapplications and 
the Costs of Ignoring the Vienna Sales Convention for Australian Lawyers, 10 MELB. J. INT’L. 
L. 141 (2009) (discussing the hypothetical approach taken by the Hannaford court, but also 
the court’s reasoning that China had not yet made Hong Kong a contracting state). 
 91 CNA Int’l, Inc. v. Guangdon Kelon Electronical Holdings, No. 05-C-5734, 2008 WL 
8901360 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2008); see also Electrocraft Arkansas, Inc. v. Super Electric 
Motors, Ltd., No. 4:09-CV-00318-SWW, 2009 WL 5181854 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009). 
 92 CNA Int’l, 2008 WL 8901360, at *2. 
 93 Id. at *2 (quoting Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993)). 
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language of Article 93(2), the district court reduced the Article as having two 
requirements for a declaration: (1) to be deposited with the depository; and (2) 
to state expressly the territories to which the CISG extends.94  The court deter-
mined that the list filed with the Secretary-General by China satisfied the first 
requirement but not the second.95 The court found that, logically, for the list to 
be an Article 93 declaration it must include an exhaustive and definitive list of 
all treaties to be applied.96  Yet, the Chinese notice itself provided that for any 
treaty not listed the Chinese government would separately carry out any formal-
ities required if the government decided to apply the treaty to Hong Kong.97 Oth-
erwise, application of the treaty would be automatic where the terms must apply 
to the whole state. 
 
C. The CISG Should Apply to Hong Kong 
 
Notwithstanding the CISG’s goal of promoting uniformity in international ju-
risprudence, the CISG should apply to Hong Kong. The formalism approach is 
more congruous with the drafting history of the CISG, and the logic employed 
by the CNA International court is more persuasive than the approach taken by 
the intentionalism courts. The evolution of the CISG from the Hague Conven-
tions and the Vienna Convention demonstrates that a ratifying state to the CISG 
understood the treaty to apply to all of the state’s territory, absent a declaration 
under Article 93. China’s 1997 list of applicable treaties should not be considered 
a valid Article 93 declaration because the history of the CISG militates in favor 
of express declarations, and China’s list on its face leaves open the notion that 
the list is not exhaustive. 
The CISG is a product of the United Nations’ response to the changing land-
scape of global trade and emerging states after the end of decolonization. The 
period following the Hague Conventions saw a marked increase in exports to and 
the economic reformation of developing countries in Asia, particularly oil-pro-
ducing countries and industrializing countries.98 The desire to create a uniform 
law code that would add cohesion and certainty to trade between separate legal 
traditions became increasingly demanding, resulting in the flexible CISG.99 The 
decolonization of much of Africa and Asia led to the development of states that 
 
 94 CNA Int’l, 2008 WL 8901360, at *4. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Rep. on Trade and Development 1982, 
UNCTAD/TDR/2/Rev.1, 56-57. 
 99 Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 1969, supra note 28; UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 55, 
at xi, ¶¶ 2–4. 
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now find themselves forming, or being left in, political structures of federated 
systems, attempting to unite historically distinct peoples and territories.100 The 
CISG Drafting Committee drafted the CISG against this new political structure 
backdrop. The Commission on International Trade’s initial study into why the 
Hague Conventions were not universally adopted reflects this purpose of the 
CISG to appeal to diverse legal traditions and political structures.101 Further, the 
Vienna Convention’s mandate for absolute territorial application is reflected in 
the change that the CISG makes from the “metropolitan” and “dependent terri-
tories” of the Hague Conventions into paragraph (4) of Article 93 of the CISG: 
“[i]f a Contracting State makes no declaration under paragraph (1) of this article, 
the Convention is to extend to all territorial units of that State.”102 
Article 93 of the CISG shifts the default rule from solely metropolitan appli-
cation into absolute application, and it is with this evolution and critical purpose 
that Article 93(2) demands a contracting member “to state expressly the territo-
rial units to which the Convention extends.”103 In practice, declaring states have 
expressly stated the territories to which the Convention extends,104 and China’s 
1997 list does not comport with this established procedure and history of Article 
93. The goal of the CISG is uniformity and the creation of an “international char-
acter,”105 and the bulk of the current case law on the question of the CISG’s 
applicability to Hong Kong suggests a possible conclusion that China’s 1997 list 
should be considered an intended Article 93 declaration.’ However, the possibil-
ity of there being an intentionalist trend in international case law should not un-
dercut the reasons behind Article 93 and its practice. Indeed, the CAN Interna-
tional court’s argument that the 1997 list by its own terms cannot be exhaustive 
or all-inclusive is compelling. While it may be most efficient to take China’s 
1997 list as an “until-further-notice,” all-inclusive depositary notification, that 
line of thinking should not be used as an easy-out from the express procedures 
of Article 93. Accordingly, China’s 1997 list should not constitute an Article 93 
 
 100 See Donald Rothchild, African Federations and the Diplomacy of Decolonization, 4 J.  
DEVELOPING AREAS 509, 509 (1970) (discussing the use of federalism to unify historically 
disparate tribes and cultures in decolonized African countries); Michael Breen, The Origins of 
Holding-Together Federalism: Nepal, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, 48 J. FEDERALISM 26, 28–29 
(2017) (discussing the use of federalism to unify historically disparate people groups in decol-
onized Nepal, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka). 
 101 Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 1969, supra note 28, at ¶ 38; Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 
1973, supra note 63, at ¶ 19. 
 102 See The Hague Convention of 1955, supra note 30; the Hague Convention of 1964, 
supra note 37; Vienna Convention, supra note 40; CISG, supra note 2. 
 103 CISG, supra note 2. 
 104 See Canada 1991 Declaration, supra note 47; Canada 1992 Declaration, supra note 47; 
Denmark Declaration, supra note 47. 
 105 CISG, supra note 2, at art. 7, ¶ 1; UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 55, at 42, ¶¶ 2–6. 
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declaration, and pursuant to the provisions of the Joint Declaration and Article 




The recent volatility of the relationship between mainland China and Hong 
Kong has pushed the status of political and economic rights in Hong Kong to the 
fore. The ambiguity of the Joint Declaration and the subsequent Basic Law often 
will raise questions of political and economic autonomy for the special adminis-
trative region, but the power of the central government to bind Hong Kong to 
international agreements is perhaps one of the clearer aspects of the relation-
ship.106 Less clear is whether China has used this power to bind Hong Kong to 
the CISG. This study argues that China has not used this power because Article 
93 of the CISG explicitly provides that for a contracting state to restrict territorial 
applicability, it must expressly state the territories to which the Convention will 
extend. Additionally, the history of Article 93 declarations has demonstrated that 
Article 93 is an attempt to bring more uniformity and certainty to the changing 
landscape of global trade, in accordance with the overall mission of the CISG, 
and that declaring states—in practice—do expressly name territories of applica-
bility or non-applicability. The intentionalist approach that some courts have 
taken to the question does not conform to the mission and practice of the CISG. 
China’s 1997 list does not expressly constitute an Article 93 declaration and, by 
its terms, does not attempt to do so. 
 
 
 106 Basic Law, supra note 18, at art. 93. 
